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At least since the French Revolution, the idea of constituent power has been used to
indicate the power the people have to create legal-political orders. As such, the
history of constituent power is deeply tied to the principle of popular power and,
through it, to the history of democracy, to its theory and to its practice. Not only
does constituent power point to the process through which a democratic polity is
instituted via procedures of constitution-making. It also acts as a reminder that the
source of constitutional normativity lies in the will of the people. As a result,
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constituent power functions as a ‘bridge concept’ between the sphere of law and
that of politics. This has traditionally resulted in two separate fields of academic
scholarship. On the one side are those who think about constituent power to study
the legal implications of the idea. They tend to focus on the workings of constituent
assemblies and on the status of constitutional norms, their amendment procedures
and their relationship to secondary law-making. This approach highlights the
centrality of the idea of constituent power to the workings of the legal system. On
the other side, are those scholars who look at constituent power to emphasise its
political dimension. This is often part of a project of constitutional contestation,
whereby constituent power is presented as an absolute popular power that can never
be reduced to legal norms and that, as a result, exists alongside the constitutional
system and is always potentially capable of overturning it. In this critical exchange,
we aim to raise a different set of questions and ask how the idea of constituent
power informs our way of thinking about some fundamental institutions of the
modern democratic state: constitutional courts, legislatures, federalism, central
banks and referendums.
At its core, the legitimacy of modern democratic states lies in the fact that they
are structured around the principle according to which power belongs to, and
springs from, the will of the people. This is evident at the level of the state’s
structure, and much work has been done to determine the specific relationship that
ties the liberal constitutional state to the democratic principle of popular power.
Moreover, the legitimacy of single institutions depends on their consistency with
the principle of popular power. This is not only true of well-studied institutions
such as parliaments and constitutional courts, but also of relatively overlooked ones
of the likes of referendums, federalism, electoral laws, bicameral legislatures and
central banks, to name just a few. Yet the principle of popular power has no single
meaning and can be articulated in a variety of different ways, which in turn offer
different accounts of what makes state institutions democratically legitimate. In
fact, depending on how the principle of popular power is interpreted, some
institutions may appear completely legitimate, while others will not.
The history of the French Revolution offers a stark example. When debating the
institutional implications of the newly established principle of popular power,
representatives at the National Constituent Assembly of 1789 found themselves
divided between at least two camps. Those, like Mirabeau, who understood the
principle of popular power as expressed through the language of national
sovereignty, believed that it could only be realised through the mediation of
representatives in the assembly. By contrast, those, like Pétion, who relied on the
idea of popular sovereignty tended to argue that only forms of direct or semi-direct
democracy were consistent with the principle of popular power (Jaume, 1989). This
divergence not only underscored different understandings of who the people were
and what their political power entailed, but they also had divergent institutional
implications: while supporters of national sovereignty defended the institution of
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the representative mandate, theorists of popular sovereignty argued in favour of the
imperative mandate. The French National Assembly eventually opted for
representative mandates, which became standard practice around the world. Yet
the principle of popular power is still interpreted in a variety of ways which, in turn,
correspond to different ways of assessing the democratic legitimacy of modern
institutions. Among the various ways of conceptualising the principle according to
which power belongs to the people is also the idea of constituent power, which is
the subject of this Critical Exchange.
In what follows, we ask: what are the consequences of assessing the legitimacy
of given institutions through the lenses offered by the notion of constituent power?
To do so, we start from the premise that constituent power represents a specific
interpretation of the principle of popular power. In other words, we take constituent
power to be neither a term that indicates just any possible meaning of the principle,
nor an abstract and indeterminate account of popular power. Instead, we believe
that constituent power has a discreet meaning of its own and that, as such, it offers a
specific interpretation of the principle of popular power. The specificity of
constituent power derives from both its conceptual structure and its history.
Starting with the former, and as the very words suggest, constituent power is part of
a conceptual pair. It is a power that constitutes legal-political structures and that, as
such, is in a direct conceptual relation with the idea of a constituted power. This
indicates institutions as different as supreme courts and soviets, electoral laws and
revolutionary assemblies. Yet they all have in common the fact that they have not
constituted themselves. Instead, they owe their origins to a superior source of
political legitimacy, i.e. the constituent power. Because of this intimate connection
with the constituted powers, the idea of constituent power is conceptually different
from other interpretations of popular power, including the more popular notion of
sovereignty (Rubinelli, 2020). The latter, in all its various iterations, has no
necessary conceptual connection to the institutionalisation of power. Sovereignty,
by definition, is a power that is self-standing, and nothing in its conceptual structure
suggests that it needs to be used to institutionalise power. Although the notion of
sovereignty can of course be used to legitimise the creation of legal and political
institutions, the concept itself does not bind it to a type of politics that is
constituted. By contrast, constituent power, almost out of conceptual necessity, is
strictly connected to institutional politics.
The specificity of constituent power as a way of thinking about popular power is
also proved by the history of the idea. While different renditions of this history
exist, the first modern uses of constituent power coincide with French revolutionary
political thought and, more specifically, with Emmanuel Sieyès’ claim that, in
1789, the Third Estate was the bearer of the pouvoir constituant (Sieyès, 2014).
This meant that only the productive part of society, as opposed to the nobility and
the clergy, had the right to exercise political power and, through it, to constitute a
new constitutional order. While arguing this case, Sieyès was careful not to confuse
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his own theory of constituent power with competing accounts of popular power
channelled through the language of sovereignty. This was because, Sieyès
maintained, the very term sovereignty entailed an absolute power that can never
be restrained and that could be abused by its bearer, be it the people, the king or
parliament. By contrast, constituent power is exercised only to create a constituted
order, which is limited, regulated and kept in check by the fact that it is not the
source of its own legitimacy and that, as such, cannot change its mandate. Starting
from this first theorisation of constituent power, the idea was used widely in a
variety of different contexts across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In each
of these contexts, it offered slightly different interpretations of what it meant to say
that political power belongs to the people, and it was used to legitimise widely
different sets of institutional structures (Rubinelli, 2020). Yet all these different
theories and uses of constituent power had one thing in common: they portrayed
constituent power as being in a strict conceptual relation with the institutions of the
modern constitutional state (Colón-Rı́os, 2020). This relation, in turn, underscores
the specificity of constituent power as a conceptualisation of the principle of
popular power both from a historical and from a conceptual perspective. And it is
precisely the specific relation connecting the idea of constituent power to what I
have hitherto referred to as ‘institutions’ that is the subject of this Critical
Exchange.
In the contributions that follow, the authors investigate the specific relation
connecting the idea of constituent power to the following institutions: constitutional
courts, referendums, federalism, central banks and legislatures. Some of these
institutions, such as constitutional courts and legislatures, have a long historical
connection to the idea of constituent power, whose features we aim to elucidate and
problematize in the pages of this Critical Exchange. Other institutions, such as
central banks, are not usually analysed in relation to the idea of constituent power
or are mostly discussed with reference to ideas of sovereignty, as is the case of
referendums and federalism. The theorists included here will take a different
approach and suggest that there is much to be learnt from broadening the analysis
of such institutions to include the idea of constituent power.
In the first contribution, Pasquale Pasquino examines the role of constitutional
courts. He argues that courts are legitimate only insofar as they act as a ‘derivative
constituent power’. This means that their role is limited to filling the gaps
necessarily present in the constitution and to interpreting the principles and values
informing the original decision of the constituent power. To do so, courts cannot act
in the void, ignoring the specific socio-historical circumstances they are called to
act upon. This means that, instead of blindly applying the values of the original
constituent power, they ought to interpret them in the light of changing historical
circumstances. Equally, courts cannot be captured by the executive or by the
legislature and retain their legitimacy vis à vis the constituent power. On the
contrary, they must maintain their independence as part of a wider system of
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separation of powers. It thus follows that the legitimacy of constitutional courts
depends on their capacity to uphold the values expressed by the original constituent
power, while integrating them with the specific interpretations of those values
prevalent in a given society at a certain point in time.
Our second contributor is Joel Colón-Rı́os, who asks: what are the theoretical
and the practical consequences of thinking about referendums through the idea of
constituent power? He argues that the very conceptual structure of the idea
necessarily complicates the relationship between the referendum and democracy.
If, as scholars often seem to believe, the referendum is an instance of direct
democracy, then it cannot be an expression of constituent power, which is a
creature of representative politics. According to the theory of constituent power,
there must be a separation between popular authority and governmental power. If
referendums are indeed expressions of direct democracy, then they abolish the
distinction between constituent and constituted power, and transfer all powers in
the hands of the people. Yet Colón-Rı́os maintains that this argument is misleading.
Referendums are themselves part of representative politics. They are organised
according to legal procedures, often by representatives, who decide on the question
to be put to the people and on the composition of the electorate. As such, the
referendum is part of the constituted order, and expresses the will of the constituted
powers, i.e. the representatives and the electors. It thus follows that the legitimacy
of the referendum derives not from its direct appeal to the people, but from the fact
that it is part of the institutional structure of the constitutional state. Yet, Colón-
Rı́os maintains, the constituted nature of the referendum can, at exceptional times,
effectively channel the will of the constituent power. This happens only when the
referendum is used to modify the constitution or to establish a mandate to create a
new constitutional text. In these rare occasions, the referendum obtains legitimacy,
not from the constituted order, but because of the constituent will it expresses.
In our third contribution, Eva Marlene Hausteiner analyses the role of
constituent power in federal states. This question, she argues, demands special
attention because of the peculiarly complex nature of federal constitutions. These
are indeed prone to radical change, which takes place outside the limits imposed by
the constitution but does not overthrow it. Good examples are processes of
annexation and secession, or changes in the distribution of power across regional,
state and federal levels. These changes are the expression of neither a constituent
power of revision, as they are not regulated by the constitution, nor of a fully-
fledged constituent power, as they do not create a new constitutional order. By
contrast, Hausteiner suggests, we should consider them the expression of a re-
constituent power. Further, the subject of constituent power is also different in
federal states. While the source of legitimacy of unitary constitutions is identified in
the will of a ‘unitary people’ – as fictional as this unity effectively is – federal states
are made of a multi-layered demos. This means that the subject of constituent
power expresses itself through a multi-layered process of decision-making which,
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Hausteiner suggests, adds up to a more demanding standard of democratic
legitimacy and could be called pouvoir constituant mixte.
Hjalte Lokdam’s contribution to this Exchange questions whether central banks
in general, and the European Central Bank in particular, are to be considered
democratically legitimate. He argues that the idea of constituent power, although
only rarely applied to central banks, can offer a valuable frame to answer this
question. First, Lokdam maintains that, differently from other central banks, the
ECB could effectively be thought of as a product of the European constituent
power, although this should be seen as a multi-layered power acting through
extraordinary representatives in a federal setting. Second, Lokdam asks what are
the implications of thinking about the ECB through the idea of constituent power.
While, on the one hand, associating the ECB to constituent power bestows it with
democratic legitimacy, on the other hand it engenders some risks. This is because,
if the mandate of the ECB comes directly from the people, then it must be a rigid
mandate, which cannot be easily bent to changing political circumstances. Yet, in
moments of crisis, such as the sovereign debt crisis of 2011, this very rigidity might
become an obstacle to prompt and swift action and result in the suspension of the
ECB’s democratic mandate. This, in turn, gives a free hand to the unelected experts
and insulates their acts from democratic contestation. Whether a European
constituent power could give a more flexible mandate, and hence bestow both
legitimacy and flexibility on the ECB, remains an open question.
Our final contribution is by William Selinger. He asks how the role of the legislature
would change if we assessed it in relation to the idea of constituent power. At first sight,
Selinger suggests, it looks like the power of the legislature would have to be limited by
the fact of being a constituted power. This argument is further strengthened by the fact
that circumscribing the power of the representative assembly was one of Sieyès’ main
goals when theorising constituent power. Yet, Selinger argues, if we stopped thinking
about the legitimacy of legislatures in terms of sovereignty, and instead started
referring to constituent power, we might come to a surprising conclusion. The idea of
constituent power, when associated to legislatures, strengthens their power and that of
the representatives who sit in them. This is because constituent power depicts the
people as the original source of power, which, however, disappears in the background
during times of ordinary politics. It thus follows that, differently from what happens
with the idea of sovereignty, the people cannot be considered the ultimate decision-
makers. On the contrary, this power is vested in the representatives, who nonetheless
are a constituted power and thus have to act within the limits of their constitutional
mandate. In other words, Selinger maintains that thinking about legislatures through
the lenses of constituent power both limits and strengthens their power: it limits
legislatures because it clarifies their constituted nature, but it strengthens legislatures
because it insulates them from the idea of an overarching sovereign will of the people.
The aim of this Critical Exchange is to underline the conceptual and historical
specificity of the idea of constituent power. Far from being just a synonym for
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sovereignty, it offers a specific way of interpreting the principle of popular power,
one that ties its exercise to the fundamental institutions of the modern state. And
when assessing their legitimacy through the idea of constituent power, it becomes
clear that some institutions are, as a result, strengthened in their relationship to the
principle of popular power (constitutional courts and legislatures), while others
invite a thorough questioning of their function within the constitutional state
(referendums, federalism and central banks). This proves that there is much to be
gained from thinking about democratic politics through the idea of constituent
power. Not only does it demand that we distinguish between different ways of
conceptualising the principle of popular power; it also forces us to clarify how we
assign democratic legitimacy to our institutions and why.
Lucia Rubinelli
Constitutional courts and amending constituent power
Constitutions, more specifically written liberal constitutions – the only ones I’m
going to consider in the following remarks – are a set of rigid, entrenched legal
norms concerning the structure of the government and the fundamental rights it
must guarantee to the members of a political community. The well known
exceptions in this family are the customary constitution of the United Kingdom and
the mix of written but flexible laws and unwritten conventions making up the
constitution of New Zealand. Rigidity refers to the existence of complex legal
procedures (more demanding than those used to enact ordinary laws and often
super-majoritarian) to modify the constitutional status quo, procedures, that include
either at least part of the parliamentary opposition or more or less direct popular
decisions (Albert, 2014; Albert, 2019; Report on Constitutional Amendment, 2009;
Ehmke, 1953). It is important to emphasize that rigidity is no more than a legal
quality of the fundamental laws of a country, and it is not, as such, equivalent to the
stability of a constitutional order. The latter depends on concrete specific historical,
political and economic circumstances, so it is not surprising, given the political
history of the country from the Revolution onward, that France had many more
rigid constitutions since 1791 than the United Kingdom, which instead slowly
modified over time its flexible customary constitutional order (Bryce, 1901,
pp. 124–213; Lasalle, 1862).
It is even more relevant, given my focus, to distinguish the constituent power
stricto sensu from the power to amend and modify the constitution – the French
doctrine speaks of original and derivative constituent power. The theory of
constituent power, introduced in the continental European debate, notably by
Sieyes and further developed by Carl Schmitt in his Theory of Constitution (1928),
refers to a foundational moment, which marks a radical break with a previously
existing (mostly colonial or monarchical) legal order. In liberal democratic
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representative regimes, constituent power entails some form of popular participa-
tion in the process of ratifying and enacting the new fundamental order of the
political community delineated in the constitutional document. Moreover,
constituent power supports it over time.
The pouvoir constituant dérivé is instead a constituted power, typically specified
in the written rigid constitution, a concept which has rarely been the object of
systematic investigation (Levinson, 1995). As said, it is normally exercised either
by a supermajority of the elected representatives, or by a mix of representative and
popular decision-making, sometimes via referendum. Additionally, constitutional
courts, in their own way, exercise some form of constitution amending power (for
the South African exception, see Gloppen, 2018). This is not the original
constituent power in its radical version: courts modify the constitutional order by
filling its gaps or by interpreting its principles and values, and I shall try to explain
briefly why and how.
To understand such unusual claim, i.e. that courts exercise a derived constituent
power, we need to be aware that all written constitutions are inevitably ‘incomplete
contracts’. Even the best and less short-sighted founding fathers cannot foresee all
the possible questions, cases and controversies that can rise under the constitution
they write. This is particularly true when the constitutional document is old and
survived for a very long time, as in the American case. So, saying that a
constitutional court is just ‘enforcing’ the constitution, when a case or a question
emerges and the court is asked to adjudicate it, does not make much sense. It is
implausible to argue that interpreting the constitution means simply looking back at
the ‘original intent’ of the founders. It is a strange exercise to speculate about what
the founders would have thought about questions unimaginable at the end of the
eighteenth century (speaking of the US constitution), as is evident in the case of
what should be done about internet regulation, or same sex marriage or Covid-19.
Instead, I will argue that constitutional courts act as derivative constituent
powers by presenting two examples drawn from much more recent constitutions.
The first has to do with the Italian republican charter enacted in 1948, the second
with the French constitution of the Fifth Republic.
Among the powers that the constitution assigns to the Italian constitutional court
there is the adjudication of the so called conflitti di attribuzione (conflicts of
institutional competences) among high state organs – notably the legislative, the
executive and the judiciary, or between the national government and the regions
(see art. 134). A similar competence exists in the German (Organstreitigkeit, art.
93) and the Spanish constitutions (art. 161 c.). The Court is thus given the
important task of defending the structure of divided power of any liberal
constitution. When a conflict between the organs of a pluralistic authority emerges,
the system needs a judge to avoid the derailing of the anti-monocratic authority
established by the fundamental law.
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On 19 October 1995 the Italian Senate voted a motion of non-confidence against
the attorney general Filippo Mancuso, who sued the upper house before the
constitutional court for the violation of art. 94 of the Italian constitution, which
regulates the process of the government’s investiture as a single body. Mancuso
argued that the constitution speaks of a vote of confidence and no-confidence
concerning the government as a collegial body and that a no-confidence vote
against a single member of the government was unconstitutional, so that, in his
opinion, the entire government should have resigned. In its decision of 18 January
1996 (Sentenza Corte Costituzionale 7, 1996), the court rejected the interpretation
of the constitution presented by Mancuso and declared that the articles of the
constitution concerning the government’s political accountability vis-à-vis the
houses of the parliament did not exclude the vote of no-confidence addressed to a
single member of the cabinet.
In such cases, it is unrealistic to claim that the court is merely implementing the
constitution. Through an interpretation of constitutional articles concerning
executive accountability (based on the history of parliamentarism in other
European countries – even though this research is not mentioned explicitly in the
court’s opinion), the judges were filling a gap in the constitutional text. In fact, they
wrote a little extension of the fundamental law, responding or supplementing the
existent blindspot. In a limited, marginal sense they were amending or integrating
the constitution – something that neither the parliament nor the minister would
have been able to do, because an actor cannot be a judge in their own trial, without
destroying the structure of divided power in liberal constitutions, and thereby
establishing a monocratic sovereign state organ.
It may be noticed that even in the UK, where there is no written and rigid
constitution, a court of justice – the supreme court – was recently asked to decide
on a conflict between parliament and the prime minister, and not surprisingly it
decided in favor of the consolidated doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. This
judgement shows that the sovereignty in question is not so absolute as to exclude a
conflict between the parliament and the prime minister that may emerge and thus
will be judged by an independent judicial body (Miller (Appellant) v The Prime
Minister (Respondent), 2019).
The second example supporting my claim is the decision of the French Conseil
constitutionnel of 15 January 1975 concerning the statute on interruption
volontaire de grossesse (abortion) voted by the parliament but referred before its
promulgation to the council by a minority of representatives hostile to it.1
The hybrid nature of the French constitutional council, which used to be a mix
between a court of justice (as it largely is now) and a sort of executive organ of the
constitutional system (as was the case in 1958) is the origin of a unique practice:
the internal deliberations among the members of the council are recorded, and, as
of 2008 the proceedings are publicly available – since the required 25 years have
lapsed. The court decided to uphold the loi Veil, which legalized abortion (Mathieu
934  2021 The Author(s). 1470-8914 Contemporary Political Theory Vol. 20, 4, 926–956
Critical Exchange
et al., 2009, pp. 266–286). The decision and the debate in the council are of special
interest for a variety of reasons, among others the fact that in 1975, no member of
the council was expecting that the transcript of the debate would have been made
public. Here I shall focus only on the arguments of the juge rapporteur François
Goguel, which was accepted by the council. Goguel, a Catholic believer, declared
himself to be personally against the norm approved by parliament, but he
nonetheless admitted to seeing no obstacle in the constitutional text as to the
constitutionality of the statute, notably because the constitution did not say
anything about the question.2 Here again it seems that what is not forbidden by the
fundamental law may be considered compatible with the hierarchy of norms it
enshrines, provided that the court agrees on that compatibility. Therefore we can
safely say that in this case the constitution was integrated and expanded by the
decisions of the court.
The constituent power of the courts is thus mostly based on a process of
integration of the constitutional text. This integration is marginal, because there
needs to be no strong opposition in public opinion and/or among the elected
representatives. It thus follows that the type of amending power that lies in the
hands of constitutional courts’ judges is incremental. The scope of this power
depends largely on the cultural and political circumstances of each given society.
By their decisions, courts may be able to simultaneously preserve and refine the
constitutional structure of a liberal regime and to enlarge the understanding of the
rights it is meant to guarantee. In that sense, they cannot change the basic structure
of the constitution, but they can marginally interpret and rewrite its content – for as
long as they keep their relative independence vis-à-vis the political (democratically
elected) actors.
Courts are certainly not all-powerful institutions. They only work thanks to the
support of public opinion and acceptance by the elected representatives. As a
counterexample, one can think of the constitutional courts of Hungary and Poland
captured by the executive after the illiberal turn of those regimes, whose legitimacy
is seriously contested. In liberal societies, based on the principle of divided power
and its polyarchic structure, constitutional courts are actors exercising a limited,
incremental derivative constitution-rewriting power.
Pasquale Pasquino
Constituent power and referendums
When the idea of constituent power is deployed in contemporary constitutional
discourse, it is often associated with referendums. This is hardly surprising, for in
contemporary societies, referendums are the key mechanism for the formal
involvement of the citizenry in the making of political decisions. Upon closer
examination, however, the connections between referendums and constituent power
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are much more tenuous than what may otherwise appear. This is not to deny that
the prevailing view rests on apparently strong grounds. On the one hand,
referendums are historically related to the imperative mandate, and in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the imperative mandate was frequently
seen as the means through which the constituent subject controlled the actions of
those sitting in the constitution-making assemblies. On the other hand, although the
theory of constituent power presupposes a representative form of government (i.e. a
distinction between constituent and constituted authority), the democratic exercise
of constituent power seems to require the type of direct popular involvement
facilitated by a referendum. This contribution explores the connections and
disconnections between constituent power and referendums from a theoretical
perspective and from the perspective of actual constitutional practice. On the
theoretical front, it argues that while referendums cannot exhaust the nature of
constituent activity, they can play an important role in the exercise of constituent
power. The practical implications of this view, my contribution shows, have been
exemplified in the jurisprudence of the Colombian Constitutional Court.
Referendums are the main formal mechanism of direct democracy in societies
whose size makes it impossible for the entire citizenry to assemble in a single law-
making body. In theory, they allow the electorate to make decisions about specific
political issues and, in many if not most constitutional arrangements, those
decisions are binding on all representative and governmental institutions. The
institutionalisation of the referendums is, in this sense, a democratic correction to
representative democracy which, apart from the episodical vote to elect represen-
tatives, does not require any form of direct popular intervention in the making of
political decisions. Referendums are typically (though not exclusively) reserved to
moments of constitutional change, times where the electorate is asked to authorise a
modification of the fundamental laws of the state. It is in those moments, and not
during the adoption of ordinary laws or policies, that democratic principles seem to
demand direct citizen involvement. If constituent power is understood as the
popular power to create and change constitutions, and if referendums allow the
electorate to ratify or reject a draft constitution or a proposed change to an existing
one, then they seem to be the obvious mode of exercising constituent power in
contemporary constitutional orders.
That is how the relationship between constituent power and referendums is
generally understood by constitutional lawyers. This approach assumes, wrongly in
my view, that the ideal institutionalisation of the exercise of constituent power
would be direct democracy. The theory of constituent power is in fact a creature of
political representation: in a direct democracy, a system where all laws, including
the fundamental ones, can be drafted and adopted by the entire citizenry, there is no
need for the theory of constituent power, which is a theory about a separation
between constituent (popular) and constituted (governmental) authority. Accord-
ingly, if referendums are to be understood as a possible institutionalisation of
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constituent activity, the fact that they are a formal mechanism of direct democracy
is not enough. Indeed, there may be other mechanisms that, because of their
deliberative, participatory, or inclusive nature, may be more appropriate for the
exercise of constituent power than a simple yes or no vote in a referendum (In the
second part of my contribution I consider the reasons why the traditional view,
despite overstating the connections between constituent power and direct democ-
racy, is nonetheless right in attributing to referendums a key role in constituent
activity).
Now, like constituent power, the institution of the referendum is also a creature
of political representation. The raison d’être of referendums is the need to submit
to the citizenry certain decisions that, because of their constitutional significance,
should not be left solely in the hands of representatives. Seen from this perspective,
referendums play a similar role to that assumed by the imperative mandate at
different points long before the great revolutions of the eighteenth century. Before
its almost universal abolition, the imperative mandate served as an important link
between representatives and the voters who elected them. The idea that
representatives are bound by citizens’ instructions, although in theory applicable
to every kind of decision, usually acquired a special importance in the context of
constitutional change, that is, during the exercise of constituent power (Wood,
1998, p. 191). The imperative mandate appeared, in the eyes of some, as the means
through which the citizens who sat in primary assemblies and town meetings could
control and influence the conduct of delegates called to engage in constituent
activity. While the abolition of the imperative mandate meant that citizens could
not influence the actions of those delegates ex ante, the referendum allowed them to
control them ex post. In fact, as Pedro de Vega has shown, in the Middle Ages, the
word ‘referendum’ was used to refer to communications between delegates and
their electors about issues that emerged before the assembly and that had not been
specifically included in the former’s mandates. Delegates would express opinions
on those issues, ad referendum, that is, subject to the subsequent ratification of their
constituents (1985). Despite these connections, the difference between the
imperative mandate and the referendum (the first one taking the form of an ex
ante instruction; the second one of a potential veto) has important implications in
the context of constitutional change in current legal systems.
Consider the participation of the electorate in constitutional reform, one of the
instances in which contemporary constitutions tend to require the direct partici-
pation of the electorate. In the context of constitutional reform, the electorate does
not act as a constitution-maker but as an institution of control. It does not create
new constitutional forms or is even necessarily consulted about what those forms
should be, but rather vetoes or confirms decisions about constitutional content
made by others. Those others could take the form of an elected constitution-making
body, of a legislature acting through a special majority, of an ordinary legislature,
or even of a non-elected commission of experts. Moreover, the referendum will be
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subject to a set of legal procedures that limit in important ways the extent of
popular participation (e.g. a yes or no vote, no formal deliberation), that may only
identify as voters those individuals that had previously met certain more or less
arbitrary eligibility criteria (e.g. criteria about age, residency), or that may give
more weight to the votes of the minority (as any decision-rule other than 50%+1
would do). Those kinds of procedural limits seem more consistent with an
electorate playing the function of a state organ, of a constituted authority, than with
a popular exercise of constituent power. The question then becomes whether the
electorate, when it acts through a referendum, could ever be understood as
exercising constituent power. I now turn to consider a possible answer to that
question. Can the electorate be understood as more than a state organ playing a
discreet function within a larger process of constitutional reform? Can it be (or
should be) seen as a juridical manifestation of the constituent people (Colón-Rı́os,
2020)? Some constitutional theorists have explicitly considered these questions.
Carl Schmitt, for example, maintained that ‘even the constitutional powers and
competencies of the ‘‘people’’, which is to say the state citizens entitled to vote’
(such as the referendum and the initiative under Articles 73 and 76 of the Weimar
Constitution), are not ‘powers of the sovereign people, who give themselves a
constitution and engage in acts of the constitution making power. They are, rather,
competencies in the context of the constitution that is already provided’ (Schmitt,
2008, pp. 145–146). For Schmitt, to the extent that a referendum only allows the
electorate to act according to a legally controlled process of constitutional reform,
it cannot be a means for the exercise of constituent power. According to Schmitt’s
understanding of the limits of the power of constitutional reform, this means that a
constitutionally regulated referendum will not be enough for the legitimate
alteration of the material constitution (i.e. the constitution’s fundamental content,
which Schmitt called the ‘substance of the constitution’), something that falls under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the constituent subject and that cannot be subject to
determinate constitutional procedures (Schmitt, 2008, pp. 77–79).
This view has been embraced by the Colombian Constitutional Court in a series
of judgments. A democracy, the court has maintained, cannot be participatory
unless the people can also appear as the bearer of the power of constitutional
reform (Schmitt, 2008, pp. 77–79). In Colombia, this was facilitated through what
the court identified as the ‘constitutional referendum’ regulated by Articles 377 and
378 of the Constitution of 1991. But the court made sure to point out that the
inclusion of the referendum as part of the mechanism of constitutional reform was
not equivalent to the establishment of a ‘pure direct democracy, not subject to
judicial control’ (Judgment, C-551/03 (n 49) para 44). ‘The power of constitutional
reform, even when it includes a referendum’, the court stated, ‘is the deed of neither
the originary constituent power nor of the sovereign people, but an expression of a
juridical competency organised by the Constitution itself’ (Judgment, C-551/03 (n
49) para 40). For that reason, the court maintained, such a power is always limited
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by the impossibility of replacing the constitution. Otherwise, the power of
constitutional reform would become equivalent to the originary constituent power
(Judgment, C-551/03 (n 49) para 40; the French Constitutional Council rejected
this kind of approach in its decision no 62-20 DC, 6 November 1962). Some years
later, the same court made this point even more expressly: ‘The referendum as a
mechanism of constitutional reform is always a manifestation of the derived
constituent power [i.e. the limited power of constitutional reform that has been
delegated to the ordinary institutions of government] and not even the intervention
of the electorate…has sufficient juridical force to transform a referendum into a
foundational, primary, or originary constituent act’ (Judgment C-141/10, Colom-
bian Constitutional Court, para 1.3).
The type of electoral acts examined in those judgments can be identified, as
suggested by the court itself, as constitutional referendums. That is, referendums
through which a proposed constitutional change is approved or rejected as part of a
procedure established by the constitutional amendment rule. But not all referen-
dums are like that. Indeed, the Colombian Constitutional Court has distinguished
between situations where the people, acting ‘outside of any normative channel,
decides to alter the constitution or give itself a new one’ and situations ‘where the
citizenry acts as a constituted organ, and accordingly, as a limited one’ (Judgment
C-140/10, Colombian Constitutional Court, para 1.4). In the former scenario, the
people act as the constituent power and, in the latter, it operates as a constituted one
(Judgment C-180/07, Colombian Constitutional Court, para 2.2.2.2.1). Importantly,
the court included within the latter type of situations those cases in which,
‘according to constitutional provisions, the people is convened to decide whether to
call a national constituent assembly’ ((Judgment C-180/07, Colombian Constitu-
tional Court, para 2.2.2.2.1). That view is problematic, because such a referendum
would be authorising an entity to replace the existing constitution or to alter its
material content. The fact that it is convened according to law does not seem to be a
sufficient reason for depriving it of a constituent nature.
As Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde stated, it is true that there can be a juridical
distinction between ‘the people as an organ and the people as sovereign; however,
the two cannot be separated as though they were two distinct and real entities: in
the final analysis, they are the same ‘‘people’’’ (2017, p. 179). ‘[A]nytime the
people takes an active role as an organized entity’, he added, ‘the unorganised
people of the pouvoir constituant is also involved and present in some way’ (2017,
p. 179).
Authorising and ratificatory referendums, as long as they involve the alteration of
the material constitution, should be understood as constituent referendums, i.e.
instances in which the people exercise their constituent power directly. In the case
of a referendum calling for a constituent assembly authorised to adopt a new
constitution (within or outside the established amendment rule), the electorate
could be understood as commissioning that entity with the production of material
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constitutional content. That is, an instance in which ‘the people’ acts through the
electorate and may set conditions to which a constitution-making body will be
subject. Such conditions may include the creation of a specific type of
constitutional content within a certain period. They may also require the
submission of the new constitutional text to popular ratification. In that final
referendum, the people, acting once again through the electorate, not only accepts
or rejects a draft constitution, but also confirms that its mandate has been respected.
To conclude, I hope to have shown that the relationship between constituent
power and referendums is not as clear as it is sometimes thought. While there are
important affinities between the institution of the referendum and the exercise of
the power to create new constitutions, there are also significant tensions between
them. These tensions emerge from the fact that a referendum will normally be
regulated by a set of norms potentially inconsistent with the exercise of a truly
popular constitution-making jurisdiction. Simultaneously, however, a referendum
provides a means for the entire electorate to participate in the authorisation of a
constitution-making episode, as well as in the ratification or rejection of important
constitutional changes. In such a context, I argued, referendums can be understood
as a key part of the exercise of constituent power in contemporary societies, when a
people, acting through the electorate, participates directly in the alteration of their
country’s material constitution both by issuing a mandate for the creation of new
constitutional content and by determining if such a mandate has been respected.
Joel I. Colón-Rı́os
(Re-)Constituent power and federal change
The concept of constituent power revolves – not least due to its prominent role in
French revolutionary thought – around at least two focal points, which endure in
spite of the idea’s highly contested history (Rubinelli, 2020). On the one hand,
constituent power is still frequently associated with political founding; on the other,
many theorists continue to tie it to questions of popular sovereignty in unitary
democracies. These emphases in the conceptualization of constituent power,
however, divert attention away from constellations both more complicated and
more common than the founding of unitary states.
The locus and legitimacy of constituent power should be examined not only with
regard to the moment of founding. Political orders can also substantially transform
after their foundation in ways not projected by the founders and yet without
undergoing revolution. This raises the question of who authorizes and directs such
changes: Where does re-constituent power, understood as political power effecting
non-revolutionary but radical transformation beyond constitutional confine, reside
after the founding? I define re-constituent power – as I will elaborate further below
– as different from amending power or pouvoir constituant constitué, in that its
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transformative power does not operate within the rules of the constitution,
including the rules for constitutional amendment. Re-constituent power is thus
related to what Yaniv Roznai has called the sporadic ‘re-emergence of the primary
constituent power’ (2017, p. 25) – but it emphasizes the potentially new
configuration of the constituent subject in a situation of re-constitution.
With regard to the second conceptual limitation, constituent power has been
closely connected to the idea of a state constituted through the will of one demos –
even if this demos is potentially pluralist. But many modern democracies are
constitutionally structured in political layers, resting on the political fusion and co-
operation of multiple citizenries: they are federal, and as such they not only
distribute power through a complex institutional structure. Moreover, this structure
is often assumed to have been originally constituted by multiple collective actors.
Federal polities consist of different spheres of rules, which significantly compli-
cates the sharing and exertion of power – even when the constituting populations
are not thought of as separate peoples, let alone nations. This layering and sharing
of power among multiple collectives also affects (re-)constituent power.
The dynamics of deep transformation engrained in federations concern both
these aspects of constituent power – its continued importance in established
institutional settings, and its complications in heterogeneous polities – and they
raise questions that have so far remained unresolved: How can (re-)constituent
power be located in federal political orders? And how does this power relate to the
territorial and political segmentation of the demos into sub-units, with both the
federal and the regional level involved in the democratic process?
From the vantage point of these questions, federal polities are a particularly
interesting and difficult area for identifying the locus and essence of constituent
power, because here the ‘paradoxes’ of constituent power (Loughlin and Walker,
2018) as the power to (re)constitute a political order, are intensified. Does the
power constitutive of federations coincide with the power that transforms them?
Does, therefore, the founding constituent power constitute an ongoing constituent
power? The main interest in the following lies less in gauging the conceptual
depths of constituent power through the lens of federalism, but rather in asking:
what can the lens of constituent power contribute to our understanding of the
complicated functioning and transformation of federal democracies?
Carl Schmitt, whose emphasis on political decision with regard to constituent
power is well-known, saw the fate of federal political orders as largely outside the
control of political decision-makers. Federations, and particularly federal democ-
racies, were bound to move almost automatically towards homogeneity – towards
centralization up to the point of unitary statehood (Schmitt, 1928, pp. 363–391).3
Even if we question this thesis of a centralizing magnetism, Schmitt’s view
succinctly highlights the dynamic character of federalism. Federalism, as an
institutional framework, may carry the promise of stability and balance under often
tumultuous circumstances, and federal constitutions are frequently marked by a
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high degree of rigidity – but most federations regularly undergo changes and
conflictual dynamics of varying magnitude.
Some of these dynamics are regular and expected elements of the political and
constitution-amending process – for instance the drawn-out negotiations and
compromises between levels of government and their respective executives and
legislatures, or the re-setting of boundaries on competences, for which oftentimes
constitutional court decisions are necessary (Bednar et al., 2010). These balancing
acts within a multi-layered, complex polity have been extensively analyzed (e. g.
Benz and Broschek, 2013).
But federations are prone to much more fundamental transformations, which
raise the question of constituent power. Discussing radical centralization, Schmitt
has named just one of the directions such transformation processes can take. The
shift from politically decentralized to centralized statehood can – depending on the
political system – occur through legislative or judicial routes but also through more
informal redistributive effects. But federations also frequently expand or contract in
terms of membership. Finally, what has been called ‘federal failure’ can also be
regarded more neutrally as disintegration (Franck, 1968; Patberg, 2019) – a process
requiring, as other types of deep federal transformation, collective authorization in
order to be democratically legitimated. All these types of transformation can be
considered changes to the polity’s essence, in the sense that they shift its
composition, power distribution, and political rules.
Although in some existing federations, the modalities for federal transformation
are prescribed by the constitution (Aroney, 2017), only very few countries regulate
all the types of deep and lasting transformation.4 In Germany, for instance, the
overall federal structure is an inalterable element of the constitution,5 but the
competences of both federal centre and states can be – and have been – rearranged
through constitutional amendment; as for the accession of new member states, the
Basic Law until 1990 contained only an enlargement provision. Article 23 (1949)
was supplanted by the so-called ‘Europe-article’, which allows for the transfer of
competences to the supranational level – itself a provision for a different
federation-transforming act. Similar, though much more elaborated, procedures
exist in the EU’s treaty framework – but here as in many other federal contexts,
both regulated and unregulated modes of federal transformation co-exist. In the EU,
unregulated centralization over time towards a tightly integrated federal order on
the one hand, as criticized by Weile (1991), is accompanied by a tightly regulated
accession process on the other (cf. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmaier, 2002). In the
United States, the process of increasing centralization has been continuing almost
since the founding – propelled not only by Supreme Court decisions, but also
resource redistribution, population movement to the coasts, and, of course, the Civil
War.
Surprisingly often, therefore, fundamental changes in the essence of a federation
are not provided for in its constitution, but take place nonetheless. This practice of
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informal or unregulated transformation concerns not only drastic centralization but
also changes in territory and the number of sub-units. Not only do some federal
constitutions not provide for enlargement: very few provide for secession or
expulsion – a fact that does not prevent these transformations, as the example of the
separation of Singapore from the Malaysian Federation in 1965 shows (Hausteiner,
2018).
It is here that a key tension becomes apparent. Federations are oftentimes
designed to ensure stability under conditions of diversity, conflict, and strong
centrifugal forces, and this desire for stability becomes manifest in a certain degree
of constitutional rigidity (Aroney, 2017, p. 7). This very rigidity, however, clashes
with a key characteristic of federalism – its dynamic character. This dynamism
arises out of the multiplicity of territorially entrenched collective actors and their
political goals. Federal arrangements may be founded in the hopes of avoiding
fundamental re-constitution, but the conflicts around power and particularly around
the terms of membership – both between federal and regional levels and among the
sub-units – tend to build pressure toward re-arrangement. This characteristically
federal dynamism can amount to a fundamental restructuring of the overall polity:
its extent, its governing rules, and its self-conception.
Since federations are characterized by this tendency towards deep structural
transformation, the question arises of the nature of constituent power within
established federations. How is constituent power embodied in federal states – what
constitutes it, who exerts it, and when can it be deemed democratically legitimate?
Here, three points are of particular relevance.
Firstly, any consideration of constituent power in federations needs to determine
the threshold beyond which federal transformation amounts to re-constituent
action. Surely, constitutional amendments – as inbuilt and pre-regulated elements
of the political system – are below this threshold of constituent power. Even if they
produce fundamental changes – such as an increase of competences for the federal
centre or new rules for the admission of new members to the federation – they are
not operating outside the existing political rulebook but are part of the amending
power or pouvoir constituant constitué provided for by the constitutional framers.
However, if federations undergo transformations short of full-fledged revolution
yet fundamental and outside the bounds of the constituted order, it is plausible to
speak of re-constituent action. As explained earlier, due to efforts for federal
stability, many constitutions do not provide for the eventualities of expansion,
secession, expulsion – thus leaving room for the not-too-unlikely case of extra-
constitutional transformation. If these eventualities of federal re-arrangement are
not covered by the constitution, they alter the constitutionally established order.
Importantly, even these transformations do not operate wholly outside the existing
rulebook, but are to some extent pre-structured by it. In the case of Singapore’s
expulsion from Malaysia, for instance, both the federal parliament and the federally
elected (though mainland-dominated) executive claimed the authority to move
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against the recalcitrant member state. Even if re-constituent power therefore is not
simply a pre-constituted amending power, it is related to the powers constituted
through federal foundation: the latter creates the political preconditions for further
transformative action.6
This leads to a second point: the characteristically non-monolithic nature of
constituent action in federal constellations. Here the link between constituent and
re-constituent power is of particular relevance. Especially in what Alfred Stepan
has called the ‘coming-together’-type of federation (Stepan, 1999) – a federation
formed through a joining of several political entities – the federal structure itself is
a result of collective decision-making among multiple polities. For understandings
of constituent power which emphasize its close connection with popular
sovereignty, the split character of the federal demos is especially relevant. This
is due to the internally pluralist structure of constituent action. In a polity defining
itself through territorial segmentation, the likelihood that re-constituent action – be
it direct popular action or action relying on popular approval – emanates from
complex coalitions is considerable; and this complexity can grow after the federal
founding, if multi-level pluralism is combined with the pluralism of democratic
society. This diagnosis of twofold pluralism runs directly counter Schmitt’s
description of federal democracy, the key characteristic of which is an
inevitable tendency towards homogeneity. (Re-)Constituent power in democratic
federations is thus shaped by its multi-layered and pluralist environment. This also
means that there is a particularly high threshold for constituent action to be
democratically legitimate, since a plurality of groups and actors must be considered
in unstructured processes of deep transformation. Centralization, expansion, or
expulsion at the initiative of actors from only one sub-unit, or from only the federal
level, would hardly satisfy the legitimacy requirements associated with popular
sovereignty.
Finally, this high legitimating threshold at the same time holds the promise of a
particularly substantial legitimacy of (re-)constituent power. As Peter Niesen has
argued with regard to the federal structure of Europe, the mechanism of a pouvoir
constituant mixte – a term applied by Jürgen Habermas to the case of the EU7 –, in
which each citizen exerts power both through her member state and the European
parliament, facilitates supranational legitimacy. This theorization of mixed
constituent power is, according to Niesen, not primarily concerned with consti-
tutional transition, but it considers its operation beyond the foundational moment
and potentially throughout the existence of the federal arrangement (2016, p. 220).
Additionally, more radically transformative change, situated in the space
between the founding and revolutionary politics, can gain particularly substantive
legitimacy thanks to the peculiar structure of federalism. Ideally, federal structures
are not only able to secure civic participation and accountability on multiple levels:
they also prepare citizens to consider more than one political arena for engaging in
transformative political action. (Re)constituent power in federal constellations can
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therefore draw from more than one source of democratic legitimacy, due to the dual
role of each citizen as a citizen both of a sub-unit and of the federal polity – a role
firmly defined for ‘regular’ political processes through the constitution, but also
relevant for moments of federal re-ordering.
For federations, therefore, the answer to the question of legitimate substantive
change outside of formal constitutional provisions is particularly significant
because of their tendency toward such transformations – and because of the
pluralist nature of democratic authority entrenched in their structure. The language
of constituent power can illuminate these dynamics if it eases its focus on political
founding as well as on the territorial unity of the demos – and takes into account the
complicated ways in which the original constituent power shapes later constituent
action, without firmly predetermining it. As federal histories show, pathbreaking
foundational moments can, in a risky balancing act, both stabilize a polity and leave
open significant space for political change.
Eva Marlene Hausteiner
The central bank and the constituent power
Can central banks be institutions of the constituent power? If so, what does this
mean in terms of their political role and their legitimacy? In tandem with the
increasing involvement of politically independent central banks in governing our
economic lives, the question of their democratic foundations and legitimacy arises.
This is because central bank legitimacy fits uneasily within the mechanisms of
ordinary democratic politics. Elections are rarely, if ever, decided on questions of
monetary policy, and it is often unclear what power, if any, elected politicians have
over central banks. The question of the relationship between the central bank and
‘the people’ is therefore of some importance.
This does not have to involve the question of the constituent power, but it may.
With reference to the European Central Bank (ECB) – one of the few central banks
in the world that can meaningfully, albeit controversially, be considered an
institution of the constituent power – this contribution discusses the consequences
of thinking about central banks through the lens of constituent power. While
reference to the constituent power promises to establish a firm democratic
foundation for the central bank, the elevation of the central bank’s mandate and
authority to the constitutional level comes with certain problems. In particular, it
risks rendering the mandate of the central bank too rigid to be practical in crises,
thereby prompting a politics of suspending or altering the mandate in an emergency
situation. This, of course, is often anything but democratic.
Most central banks are not institutions of the constituent power. Their position
within the modern state has developed gradually and been entirely elite-driven.
They are constituted powers, of course, but their authority is derived from other
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constituted powers that can withdraw or alter them at will. They are products of
secondary law, not the primary law of the constitution, and were created by
ordinary political representatives working within constituted legislatures, not ‘the
people/nation’ or its extraordinary representatives in revolutions or constituent
assemblies. As such they could be called ‘secondary’ constituted powers as
opposed to the ‘primary’ constituted powers that create them (typically
legislatures).
Some central banks, however, have been created in extraordinary political
moments. The post-World War II German central bank, for instance, was created a
year before the Basic Law constituted the Federal Republic in 1949, and it enjoyed
an extraordinary position in the life of the West German state. Following its
creation, the Bundesbank quickly became a symbol of a break with Germany’s past
and presented itself as a bulwark against the dangerous excesses of politics.
Through actively cultivating public opinion in its favour, the Bundesbank
successfully established itself as an independent power within the state on a par
with the legislature and government. In conflicts with the government, the
Bundesbank appealed to ‘the people’, and, more often than not, it carried the day
(Mee, 2019). The Bundesbank, however, was formally still a secondary constituted
power, as the Bundestag held the right to alter or abolish it through ordinary
legislation. If there was a connection between the German people and the
Bundesbank, it was informal – but no less effective for that.
When the European Central Bank was created, the Bundesbank was the main
source of inspiration. Like the Bundesbank, the ECB was created in a moment that
marked a transformational break with the past. Like the Bundesbank, the ECB was
to be independent of political instruction. Unlike the Bundesbank, however, the
ECB’s mandate and institutional status were fixed in primary law, the Maastricht
Treaty. This means that no constituted power has the right to alter or abolish the
ECB through ordinary legislation. Its acts cannot be vetoed, and it cannot, in
principle, be compelled to do anything against its will. In matters pertaining to its
Treaty mandate, it can legislate without the involvement of other constituted bodies
and execute its will throughout the territory of the Eurozone without the
involvement of Member State authorities. The only check on the ECB’s powers
is judicial: it must act in accordance with the mandate given to it by the Treaty.
Such powers, combined with the independence from political authorities, make
the ECB unique among central banks. The question is whether it is an institution of
the constituent power.
The answer to this question depends to a certain extent on how the constituent
power is conceptualised. In Dictatorship, Carl Schmitt (2014, p. 123), referring to
Sieyès, defines the constituent power as
the primordial force of any state … From the infinite, incomprehensible abyss
of the force [Macht] of the pouvoir constituant, new forms emerge
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incessantly, which it can destroy at any time and in which its power is never
limited for good. It can will arbitrarily. The content of the willing has always
the same legal value like the content of a constitutional definition.
In this definition, there is nothing inherent in the idea of the constituent power that
precludes the possibility of central banks being institutions of the constituent
power. Nothing, after all, can prevent the nation/people from creating whatever
constitutional forms it desires. Thus, while central banks are not ordinarily
institutions of the constituent power, it is a theoretical possibility.
Possibility, of course, is not actuality, and there are some difficulties associated
with the concept of the constituent power in the context of the European Union.
One of these is that the treaties were not products of constituent assemblies (except
the failed Constitutional Treaty), but rather intergovernmental conferences. The
primary law of the EU is thus not a product of a formless constituent power, but of
an agreement between several constituted powers. Again, however, the theory of
the constituent power, as formulated by the Abbé Sieyès (2014, p. 91), can allow
for this through the concept of extraordinary representation. What distinguishes the
adoption of the EU treaties from other international treaties is that it transforms the
political status of the signatories – ‘from nation states to Member States’
(Bickerton, p. 2012) – as well as how they govern themselves (Larsen, 2021). In the
Eurozone this is particularly clear, as the creation of the ECB introduced a
transnational power that can implement its will within the territories of the member
states without involving national authorities. The ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty can thus be seen as an extraordinary political act that profoundly altered the
constitutional order of both the EU and its member states. The ordinary
representatives that signed (heads of states and governments) and ratified the
Treaty (in most cases, parliaments) thereby acted as extraordinary representatives.
However, even if the concept of extraordinary representation is accepted, the EU
cannot be characterised as the product of the will of a single constituent power.
Jürgen Habermas (2012) has sought to overcome this problem through conceiving
of the treaties as products of a pouvoir constituant mixte that consists of the citizens
of Europe in a dual capacity: as citizens of the EU and of their respective member
states. Notwithstanding the problem that citizenship is of course a constituted legal
status, this highlights that if the concept of constituent power is to make sense in the
EU context, it must be in the plural. The ECB (2002, p. 46; emphasis added) strikes
a similar note in describing its foundations of authority: ‘It was the sovereign
decision of the peoples of Europe (through their elected representatives) to transfer
the competency for monetary policy and the other tasks enumerated in the Treaty to
a newly created European body, and to endow it with independence from political
interference’. The ECB thereby strikes a chord similar to that of legal scholars such
as Dieted Grimm (2015, p. 48) and Miguel Poiares Maduro (2008, para. 21), who
argue that the EU treaties are attributed to the peoples of Europe, not the
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governments or parliaments of the member states. In this account, the ECB, and the
EU in general, derives its right to govern from the same source as the member
states themselves. The will of the European peoples may have been conveyed by
elected representatives, but it is the will that matters, not how it is represented.
One can dispute whether the ECB was ‘really’ the will of the peoples. Few
peoples were asked, and the German Chancellor at the time, Helmut Kohl, later
admitted that in forcing through Germany’s adoption of the euro he acted as a
dictator (Paul, 2010, p. 293). While this may disqualify the ECB’s claim to be a
product of the will of the peoples, it does not necessarily mean that the ECB’s
public law does not operate on the assumption that it is. In a sense, the ECB’s
extraordinary powers and its independence in exercising them have to be attributed
to the constituent power of the peoples. That there are multiple constituent powers
involved, however, raises certain problems.
The ECB takes the idea of central bank independence to its extreme conclusion.
Through the effective constitutionalisation of the ECB’s price stability mandate
(art. 127 TFEU) and independence from political actors at both the European and
Member State levels (art. 130 TFEU), the ECB derives its right to govern monetary
affairs from primary law. No constituted power can alter its status or mandate
through ordinary legislation. This is intended to insulate it from political pressures
that might compromise its single-minded pursuit of price stability. In principle, the
ECB and its powers can be altered or withdrawn only by a new ‘sovereign decision
by the peoples of Europe’. This means that unless the constituent power of any of
the member state peoples is abrogated, leaving them no longer a people in the
legal-political sense, all hold veto power over any change. The mandate of the ECB
is thereby potentially even more rigid, and thus inherently conservative, than that of
institutions subject only to a single constituent power.
The ECB’s independence means that no constituted powers can hold the ECB
accountable for its acts and omissions. The ECB must ‘report’ to other constituted
powers at the European level (art. 284(3) TFEU), but these institutions have no
means of punishing it if they think it is failing its obligations. The ECB’s ‘input
legitimacy’ is thus limited to the founding moment, and it is, through its ‘output
legitimacy’ (informally) accountable only to the peoples who gave it its mandate.
The ECB’s constitutional status also reflects Sieyès’ (2014, p. 89) principle that
‘[n]o type of delegated power can in any way alter the conditions of its delegation’.
Just as no other constituted power can alter the ECB, so it cannot alter its own
mandate. It is thereby controlled by law and judicial review alone. It is thereby part
of a system of checks and balances that is supposed to ensure that its governmental
discretion is constrained by ‘a clear and limited mandate’ (Issing, 2002, p. 28) that
it cannot control itself. This ‘clearly defined mandate’, according to the ECB (2002,
p. 50), ‘lies at the very heart of the … ‘‘contract’’ between the people and the
independent central bank’. It is an institution whose mandate, and the basic
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principles and values according to which it governs, are placed outside the ordinary
political process by the founding act.
The practical and democratic consequences of the ECB’s constitutional position
are wide-ranging. In ordinary times, it entails that the mandate of the central bank is
almost impossible to adjust in accordance with changing macroeconomic values.
Attributing the central bank’s mandate to the constituent power thereby attaches an
inherently conservative bias to monetary policy, which at the same time constrains
what member state authorities are able to do in terms of macroeconomic
policymaking. The democratic legitimacy of this arrangement is questionable. It
demands, at least, a strong popular attachment to the objective that the central bank
pursues (in the case of the ECB: price stability).
The emergency situation raises further problems. The rigidity associated with the
mandate in ordinary times is, in principle, carried over into the emergency
situation. The central bank’s policymaking flexibility to address the crisis is thereby
limited. The problem arises precisely because no constituted authority is
empowered to alter, adjust or suspend the mandate. It is fixed between constituent
moments. In a crisis, however, the restrictions of the mandate may threaten to
exacerbate the crisis and prevent an effective response to it. As such, the central
bank faces the age-old dilemma of emergency politics: honour the law but risk
undermining the existence of the constituted order, or act beyond the mandate but
violate the constitution. This was precisely what happened during the Eurozone
crisis, which was understood as an existential crisis for the euro. At the peak of the
crisis, the ECB famously stepped in to do ‘whatever it takes’ to rescue the euro.
However, the acts that put this promise into practice – the so-called outright
monetary transactions programme and the public sector purchases programme –
violated one of the most fundamental principles of the ECB’s mandate (the art. 127
TFEU ban on monetary financing) and radically transformed and extended the
powers of the ECB and its involvement in governing the Eurozone.
Due to its independence, no political authorities were involved in deciding on the
ECB’s emergency political acts. There may, of course, have been support from
governments across the Eurozone, but this was informal and ‘behind the scenes’.
The ECB carries sole responsibility for acts that in effect transformed the
constitutional construction of the Eurozone by, among other things, turning the
ECB into a lender of last resort for the member states (see De Grauwe, 2013;
Baldwin et al., 2015). This may be seen as a welcome development, but in
introducing it the ECB itself effectively acted as an extraordinary representative of
the constituent power. The absence of effective revolt against its acts may then be
interpreted as a form of ‘acclamation by silence’ by the European people, in the
name of whom the ECB now claims to act (see Lokdam, 2020).
This points to the problem with constructing the central bank as an institution of
the constituent power. The constitutionalisation of the central bank’s mandate, in
principle, restricts the flexibility of a central bank in dealing with unforeseen
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circumstances, because there are no institutionalised means of authorising (or
punishing) new approaches to, or objectives for, monetary policy. The central bank
as an institution of the constituent power is thereby (supposed to be) an inherently
conservative power between moments of extraordinary politics. When the mandate
proves untenable, however, the absence of institutionalised means of altering or
suspending it means that the question of how to alter the mandate becomes opaque
and inaccessible to democratic politics and contestation, as it did in the Eurozone
crisis. If anything, then, the case of the ECB as an institution of the constituent
power highlights the danger that rigid institutions of the constituent power present
to a meaningful democratic politics.
Hjalte Lokdam
Constituent power and the legislature
There is a strong case to be made that the whole purpose of the idea of constituent
power was to limit the power of legislative assemblies. By the time Sieyès gave his
famous account of constituent power in What is the Third Estate? there was already
widespread agreement about what one might do to limit the power of the executive.
First, ensure that the legislature possessed the power of the purse, making the
executive financially dependent on the legislature. Second, give the legislature the
power of impeachment, so that it could remove executive officials who violated the
law. Finally, if these two first steps were insufficient, strictly separate executive and
legislative officials so that the executive could not intervene in the legislative
process at all.
But the question of how to limit the power of the legislature was more difficult.
An executive capable of regularly checking the legislature was a frightening
prospect and one that would inevitably violate the separation of powers. This would
also introduce the prospect of endless stalemate and gridlock, a danger that might
equally arise from having a second legislative chamber. As for the people
themselves directly controlling legislative representatives through binding man-
dates, this would make it impossible for the legislature to serve as a space for
national deliberation.
Sieyès’ idea of constituent power was a way out of this bind. It was a strategy for
taming the legislature that did not require mandates, a strong executive, a senate or
a house of lords. Instead of being directly checked and controlled by any of these
other agents, the powers of the legislature would be made strictly subject to a
constitution that it was unable to change or amend. The constitution could only be
changed or amended through an entirely different process that was separate from
the normal process of passing legislation, and which ideally would involve an
entirely different representative body. Sieyès declared to the French National
Assembly:
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We have as a fundamental and constitutional principle that the ordinary
legislature will not be able to exercise the constituent power…the ordinary
National Assembly will not be more than a legislative assembly. It will be
forbidden from every touching any part of the Constitution. When it will be
necessary to review and reform some part, it is to be done by an express
Convention, limited to this unique object, that the Nation will decree the
changes that appear to it useful to make to the Constitution (Sieyès, 1789. p. 19).
Limited in this way by a constitution, and unable to exercise the constituent power,
the legislative assembly would be incapable of infringing on the rights of citizens.
These reflections on the origins of the concept of constituent power might lead
one to suppose that this concept would be of little value for thinking about
legislatures in contemporary politics. After all, most legislative assemblies today
are limited – whether through a written constitution that it is beyond the power of
the legislature to change, as Sieyès proposed, or through the sort of checks that he
opposed. Yet I want to suggest that this is not the whole story. If the constituent
power were to become widely accepted as the grounds of political authority, the
power and prominence of legislatures would be likely to radically increase.
If constituent power was originally a way to tame the power of the legislature, it
also raised the practice of the legislature, the practice of representatives coming to a
decision through deliberation and parliamentary procedure, to new heights of
importance. As Jack Rakove noted about the constitutional convention that wrote
the United States Constitution in 1787, ‘the politics of the Convention resemble
that of any legislative body, and its votes become grist for the fine-milling
techniques of roll-call analysis that are commonly used to explain decision-making
in Congress’ (1996, p. 15). The state assemblies that ratified the Constitution
resembled legislative bodies even more than the original Convention did – and this
is even more true of the French National Assembly which, to Sieyès’ dismay, was
forced to engage in actions that went well beyond the limited role of an ideal
constituent assembly. This is a trend that has lasted throughout the modern era: the
Weimar National Assembly of 1919 and the Indian Constituent Assembly were
among the many instances of large representative bodies exercising a function for
constituent power.
According to Sieyès, deliberation by a group of representatives was essential to
carrying out the task of the constituent power and formulating a constitution. A
constitution must be a national act, which is made in the general interest. Yet the
general interest was not obvious or given in advance. It was necessarily a
composite of countless smaller particular interests. The only way the general
interest could be achieved was through a consensus enacted by deliberation:
In every deliberation there is a kind of problem to be solved. This is to know,
in any given case, what the general interest would prescribe. When the
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discussion begins, it is not possible to identify the direction it will take to
reach the discovery with certainty…hence the clash and coincidence of
opinions….All these individual interests have to be allowed to jostle and
press against one another, to take hold of the question from one point of view,
then another, each trying to push it according to its strength towards some
projected goal. In this trial, views that are useful and those that are harmful
will be separated from one another. Some will fall while others will maintain
their momentum and will balance one another until, modified and purified by
their reciprocal interaction, they will end up becoming reconciled with one
another…just as in the physical universe a single more powerful movement
can be made up of a multitude of opposing forces (Sieyès, 2003, p. 39-40).
Sieyès’ use of the concept of constituent power and his opposition to the idea of
popular sovereignty are related to this approach to achieving the general interest.
Whereas the concept of popular sovereignty makes the will of the people, usually
as evinced by a plebiscite, the underlying source of legitimacy for a constitution,
the concept of constituent power makes the creation of a constitution one particular
task or function, which is to be carried out by representatives like other tasks or
functions. This is difficult to justify unless one thinks that creating a constitution is
an act that requires bringing together the representatives of different interests and
perspectives who can arrive at a decision in the general interest.
Although the convention that exercises the constituent power is not the normal
legislative assembly, it is inevitably a body with some resemblance to a legislative
assembly, and which deliberates in a somewhat similar fashion. And although the
normal legislative assembly does not exercise the constituent power, it somehow
approximates the sort of political deliberation that occurs in the act of constitutional
founding. The various interests and opinions that go into a constituent assembly are
unlikely to disappear – they are likely to also be represented in the normal
legislature, meaning there will be some continuity between the debates in the
constituent assembly and normal legislative debates.
According to the general idea of popular sovereignty, the people which rules
delegates power to different political actors – to executive, legislative and judicial
officials – none of which can claim to speak for the people definitively. In practice,
however, it tends to be the executive that expresses the best claim to represent the
people, since the choice of a president or prime minister comes closest to being a
decision in which the whole nation is involved.
If constituent power were to become widely accepted as the grounds of
constitutional legitimacy, this situation might change radically. It would remain the
case that no ordinary power – executive, legislative or judicial – could claim to
speak for the people definitively. Yet the legislature would arguably have a better
claim to do so than the other powers. It alone among the constituted powers can
plausibly attempt to achieve a ‘general interest’, since it is the only constituted
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power that allows a range of ‘individual interests…to jostle and press against one
another, to take hold of the question from one point of view, then another, each
trying to push it according to its strength towards some projected goal’ (Sieyès,
2003, pp. 39–40).
The concept of constituent power would alter the relationship between the
legislature and the people no less radically. It is easy to presume, when thinking in
terms of popular sovereignty, that the people are simply the masters of their
representatives – after all, it is the people who possess sovereignty, their
representatives are merely those delegated by them to carry out tasks that they
wish. The concept of constituent power renders this relationship significantly more
complex, since it denies that the people have the kind of final authority that goes
with sovereignty. Put another way: the electorate that chooses the members of the
legislature is itself a constituted power. It is not prior to constituted institutions, as
we might think a sovereign people is, but is constituted like them through the
constitution. The selection of representatives to the legislature is merely one
moment in the process of law-making, accomplished by one constituted power
among several. It is not a moment that reveals the sovereign will of the people. If
Sieyès sought, through his concept of constituent power, to limit the power of the
legislature, he also limited the claim to power of the electorate, and thus in another
way preserved a degree of autonomy for the legislature that is harder to justify in a
system based on popular sovereignty.
This contribution has been something of a thought experiment. If we were to
rethink the foundations of political legitimacy in terms of constituent power rather
than popular sovereignty, where might it lead with respect to the role of the
legislature? And the somewhat unexpected conclusion, given Sieyès’ intention, is
that this could very well lead to legislatures that are more prominent and more
autonomous of the electorate. Yet I suspect that this is also why constituent power
is unlikely to become our dominant political conception any time soon. In her
important recent book Constituent Power: A History (2020), Lucia Rubinelli has
documented how Sieyès’ distinction between constituent power and sovereignty
was lost in the twentieth century. Since Carl Schmitt, constituent power has been
increasingly interpreted as no different from sovereignty. But we might ask
whether this is because the sort of politics that constituent power tended toward has
become increasingly unrealistic. On the other hand, the fact that this concept is still
part of our political language, and that constitutional conventions remain an
important institution, suggests that we should not entirely discount constituent
power and the kind of politics Sieyès envisioned either.
Will Selinger
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Notes
1 This one was the first case of a saisine parlementaire (the ex-ante referral by at least 60 members of
the Parliament) introduced in France by the constitutional reform of 1974.
2 Notice that the Council deciding for the compatibility was siding with the majority of the Parliament,
whereas the public opinion was divided: 48% were favorable to abortion.
3 Schmitt uses the category of Bund instead of Föderation for federal political orders, which extends
beyond statehood and includes international federal orders of a lasting and constitutionalized kind.
4 As Nicholas Aroney has shown, constitutional amendment in federations often requires only a
majority decision, not unanimity – which may raise questions on the legitimacy of such pre-regulated
transformations. The Swiss constitution, in contrast, requires a popular referendum for an
amendment to the constitution.
5 The federal order could only be abolished through revolution – or through the resolution on a new
constitution, the procedural pathway towards which is not elaborated on in the relevant article 146 of
the Basic Law.
6 For disintegrative action, such as in the case of Malaysia, one could also speak of ‘destituent power’,
although the term is, at the moment, still claimed for a number of phenomena (cf. Patberg, 2019).
Ultimately, though, re-constituent and destituent power could be conceptualized as sub-species of
constituent power.
7 First substantiated by Anne Peters, the idea of a pouvoir constituant mixte has been applied by
Habermas to the EU constellation of a dual role of all EU citizens in the legitimatory process
(Habermas, 2011).
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Internationaler Arbeiter-Verlag.
Levinson, S. (ed.). (1995) Responding to Imperfection. The Theory and Practice of Constitutional
Amendment. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lokdam, H. (2020) ‘We Serve the People of Europe’: Reimagining the ECB’s Political Master in the
Wake of Its Emergency Politics. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studie 58(4): 978–998.
 2021 The Author(s). 1470-8914 Contemporary Political Theory Vol. 20, 4, 926–956 955
Critical Exchange
Loughlin, M. and Walker, N. (2018) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and
Constitutional Form. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Maduro, M.P. (2008) Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Kadi. CJEU.
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Föderalismen. Modelle jenseits des Bundesstaates (pp. 209–234). Nomos: Baden-Baden.
Patberg, M. (2019) Destituent power in the european union. On the limits of a negativistic logic of
constitutional politics. Journal of International Political Theory 15(1): 82–99.
Paul, J.P. (2010) Bilanz Einer Gescheiterten Kommunikation—Fallstudien Zur Deutschen Entstehungs-
geschichte Des Euro Und Ihrer Demokratietheoretischen Qualität. PhD Thesis, Frankfurt: Johann
Wolfgang Goethe-Universität.
Report on Constitutional Amendment adopted by the Venice Commission at its 81st Plenary Session
(Venice, 11-12 December 2009), viewed 21 December 2020, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/
documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2010)001-e.
Roznai, Y. (2017) Amendment power, constituent power, and popular sovereignty. In: R. Albert (ed.)
The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment (pp. 23–49). London: Hart Publishing.
Rubinelli, L. (2020) Constituent Power. A History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2002) Theorizing EU enlargement: Research focus, hypotheses,
and the state of research. Journal of European Public Policy 9(4): 500–528.
Schmitt, C. (1928) Verfassungslehre. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Schmitt, C. (2008) Constitutional Theory. Durham: Duke University Press.
Schmitt, C. (2014) Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to Proletarian
Class Struggle. Cambridge: Polity Press.
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